

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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P R 131410Z OCT 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2135

INFO DOD

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO 5443

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

EO 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: FURTHER COMMENTS ON SOVIET OCTOBER 9 DRAFT (SALT TWO-310)

1. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MIRV PROVISION, SOVIET POSITIONS CONTAINED IN THEIR DRAFT TEXT WERE FORESHADOWED AND NOT UNEXPECTED. SOVIET DRAFT TEXT SETS FORTH A MAXIMUM INGOING POSITION INDICATING WHAT THEY WANT BUT NOT NECESSARILY WHAT THEY EXPECT TO ACHIEVE. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A BARGAINING APPROACH, IT PROVIDES A LARGE AMOUNT OF TRADING ROOM BETWEEN THEIR POSITION AND ONE OF EQUITY, AND ALSO PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY THROUGH THE MULTIPLE INTERRELATED FALLBACK POSITIONS BUILT INTO THEIR TEXT. ALTHOUGH THE TEXT CONTAINS SOME FOREWARD MOVEMENT, THIS IS LARGELY OFFSET BY ITS ONE-SIDED APPROACH AND BUILT-IN FALLBACK POSITIONS.

2. THE SOVIET DRAFT IS DESIGNED TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES AND ALSO TO ACHIEVE AS ADVANTAGEOUS A POSITION AS POSSIBLE IN THE DIRECT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. ITS PROVISIONS WOULD SEEK TO ELIMINATE U.S. FBS FORCES AND TO THE EXTENT THIS IS NOT ACHIEVED, TO OBTAIN FULL COMPENSATION IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS THEREFOR. IT IN-

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CORPORATES SUCH LIMITATIONS ON ICBM, MLBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND

MODERN SLBM SUBMARINES AS WOULD PRESERVE INTO THE INDEFINITE FUTURE SOVIET INTERIM AGREEMENT ADVANTAGES IN NUMBERS AND THROW-WEIGHT. IT WOULD REDUCE THE PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS. IT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO ACHIEVE A MIRV ADVANTAGE PROPORTIONAL TO THEIR PRESENT ADVANTAGES IN ICBM, MLBM AND SLBM NUMBERS AND IN ICBM THROW-WEIGHT. THE DRAFT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN ANY OF THEIR SYSTEMS. WHILE PROTECTING ONGOING SOVIET ICBM PROGRAMS, IT WOULD STOP ONGOING U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND B-1 PROGRAMS IN EXCHANGE FOR A SOVIET UNDERTAKING TO FOREGO FOLLOW-ON SSBN AND STRATEGIC BOMBER PROGRAMS. THE U.S. CONCEPT OF A CENTRAL SYSTEMS AGGREGATE WITH APPROPRIATE FREEDOM TO MIX AND THE U.S. THROW-WEIGHT CONCEPT HAVE BEEN IGNORED. THE DRAFT AVOIDS ANY PRECISE DEFINITIONS AND IGNORES QUESTIONS OF THE VERIFIABILITY OF LIMITATIONS OTHERWISE IN THEIR INTEREST, SUCH AS THOSE ON MIRVS AND SLCMS.

3. THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS SOME ELEMENTS THAT ARE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO SHOW MOVEMENT AND/OR TO SERVE AS POINTS OF CONTACT IN NEGOTIATIONS. MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS THE FORMAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME (IN ARTICLE VIII) THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER MIRV LIMITATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEIR INGOING POSITION IS ONE-SIDED AND THROWS ON THE U.S. THE BURDEN OF TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN PUTTING FORWARD AND EQUITABLE MIRV PROPOSAL. THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED THEIR EARLIER DEMAND FOR THE COMPLETE DENUCLEARIZATION OF BOMBERS. THE WORDING OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONCERNING BOMBER LIMITATIONS MIGHT IMPLY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER UNEQUAL LEVELS OF BOMBERS FOR THE TWO SIDES PROVIDED BOMBER ARMAMENTS ARE LIMITED. THE PROPOSED BAN ON NEW GENERATIONS OF SSBNS AND NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BMMBERS IS AN INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO FOREGO SOME OF THEIR OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO HALT ONGOING U.S. PROGRAMS. THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO NON-TRANSFER ARE SUFFICIENTLY IMPRECISE AS TO SUGGEST POSSIBLE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACQUIESCE IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, OTHER THAN WARHEAD TECHNOLOGY, TO THE U.K.

4. THE SOVIETS HAVE CONSIDERABLE REDUNDACY AND OTHER INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BUILT INTO THEIR PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN OBJECTIVES EVEN IF THEY WERE TO LOSE
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SOME OF THEIR INGOING POSITIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATION. FOR EXAMPLE:

(A) TO ELIMINATE THE PRESENT U.S. ADVANTAGE IN BOMBERS;

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ACTION SS-30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2136

INFO DOD

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5443

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

-- THE SOVIET DRAFT CONTAINS A NUMBER OF SEPARATE PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSTRAIN THE U.S. BOMBER FORCE AND COULD ELIMINATE THE CURRENT U.S. HEAVY BOMBER ADVANTAGE. THESE ARE (1) THE BAN ON THE DEPLOYMENT ON "STRATEGIC BOMBERS" OF NUCLEAR ASMS, (2) THE BAN ON DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LONG RANGE ASMS, (3) THE BAN ON DEVELOPMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE PLATFORMS, (4) THE BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW "STRATEGIC BOMBERS" (I.E., THE B-1), (5) THE PHRASE "STRATEGIC BOMBERS" WHICH, BY THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC," LINKS THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF HEAVY BOMBERS TO FBS, AND (6) THE LACK OF A DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC BOMBERS" WHICH COULD EXCLUDE THEIR BACKFIRE'S, ETC., WHILE INCLUDING OUR MOTHBALLED B-52S.

-- IF THE FOREGOING FAILS, THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE AGREED NUMBER OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND ASMS SHOULD BE EQUAL FOR THE TWO SIDES.

-- THEIR POSITION WOULD NOT LIMIT AIR DEFENSE WHICH BOMBERS MUST PENETRATE.

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(B) TO RETAIN THEIR NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES IN ICBM, MLBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND SSBNS AND THEIR ADVANTAGE IN THROW-WEIGHT;

-- THE SOVIET DRAFT COULD RESULT IN THE HIGHEST NUMBERS MENTIONED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR THEM AND THE LOWEST NUMBERS FOR THE U.S. WITHOUT REQUIRING OFFSETTING SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHER REDUCTIONS AND WITH NO FREEDOM TO MIX.

-- IT WOULD PROHIBIT THE TRIDENT SSBN.

-- IT PROVIDES NO LIMITATIONS ON LAND-BASED MOBILE ICBMS. (ALSO, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SOVIET D-CLASS SSBN HAS LAUNCH TUBES LARGE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE A MISSILE WITH CAPABILITIES NEAR THAT OF THE PROPOSED TRIDENT II (D-5) MISSILE, WHEREAS THE U.S. POSEIDON-CLASS SSBN DOES NOT.)

(C) TO ENABLE THEM TO GAIN AN ADVANTAGE IN MIRVS;

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE LINKED THE MIRV LIMIT TO THE UNEQUAL NUMERICAL LIMITS ON ICBM, MLBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND THESE UNEQUAL NUMERICAL LIMITS ARE IN TURN LINKED TO THE FBS ISSUE.

-- WITH ANY PROPOSITION THAT WOULD GIVE THEM A SUFFICIENT TOTAL NUMBER, THEIR LANGUAGE WOULD ALLOW ALL THEIR MLBMS TO BE MIRVED. HENCE, EVEN IF THEY WERE TO ACCEPT EQUALITY IN NUMBERS, THEY COULD ATTAIN SIGNIFICANT SUPERIORITY IN MIRVED THROW-WEIGHT.

(D) FBS;

-- THEIR PRIMARY POSITION IS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FBS AND FOR LIQUIDATION OF U.S. BASES WITH NO LIMITATION OF SOVIET FORCES OPPOSING U.S. FBS, OR ON SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE U.S., E.G. SLCMS AND MEDIUM BOMBERS.

-- IN EXCHANGE FOR OUR AGREEING TO COMPENSATION IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS, THEY COULD FALL BACK TO THE PROVISION

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OF ARTICLE VII, PARAGRAPH 1A, WHICH WOULD, IN EFFECT, BE A FREEZE ON U.S. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AT CURRENT LEVELS WITH NO EFFECT ON ANY OF THE SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

-- THEY COULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT U.S. FORWARD
BASED AIRCRAFT ARE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERM
"STRATEGIC BOMBER" IN ARTICLE V, THEREBY INCLUDING THESE IN
THE SAME CATEGORY AS HEAVY BOMBERS.

5. IN OUR VIEW THERE IS SIMPLY NO WAY WE CAN SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATE AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT FROM THE SOVIET TEXT; THEREFORE WE FEEL THAT WE SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO SUBMITTING A U.S. COUNTER DRAFT WITH AMPLE BUILT-IN NEGOTIATING ROOM. (SEE REFTEL.)
JOHNSON

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